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The economic analysis in this paper suggests 
that a potential prefunding of the Serbian 
pension system, either through a public 
pension reserve fund or mandatory private 
pension funds, would yield an economic 
performance inferior to the existing PAYG 
financing. If a wealth transfer from current 
to future generations is desirable from the 
macroeconomic or social perspective it 
should be implemented through repayment 
of outstanding public debt, not through 
pension system prefunding. Pension reform 
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PAYG changes and adequate integration 
of voluntary retirement saving vehicles into 
the Serbian pension system.
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1. InTRODuCTIOn
The pension system in Serbia is based on the principle of intergenerational 
solidarity and Pay-As-You-Go financing: pension payments to current pensioners 
are financed from the pension contributions of current employees. Most countries 
in Europe and in the world also have public PAYG pension systems based on 
intergenerational solidarity. When public pension systems were formed - in the 
early 20th century in most countries - opting for pay-as-you-go financing was 
a logical choice, due to the high fertility rates in those times. However, since 
then most of the world has experienced demographic aging; life expectancy 
has significantly increased, while fertility rates have declined to levels which no 
longer enable even simple population reproduction in most European countries. 
Since demographic aging is creating financing challenges for PAYG pension 
systems, some economists have been arguing over the years that (partial) pension 
system funding might be a panacea for the demographic aging phenomenon. In 
fact, a common belief has been created in the general public that funded pension 
systems are a-priori superior to PAYG systems. This articles explores differences 
and similiarities between PAYG and funded pension systems and presents an 
economic framework for comparing their performance, based on the well-known 
Samuelson-Aaron Theorem. Furthermore, we explore the issue of transition costs 
that arise when a country undergoes (partial) funding of a mature PAYG system. 
We explore international experiences with the two most common approaches 
to pension system prefunding - establishment of public pension reserve funds 
and introduction of mandatory private pension funds.1 After reviewing the 
theoretical background and empirical evidence we try to answer the following 
question: would Serbia benefit from partial pension system prefunding and 
would it be able to bear the associated transition costs? 
We restrict our attention in this article to mandatory aspects of pension system 
design and do not explore voluntary (tax-prefered) retirement saving vehicles. 
Voluntary retirement savings are becoming an increasingly important aspect of 
pension systems in many countries, including Serbia. While voluntary retirement 
saving vehicles can produce significant economic benefits, they are mostly 
restricted to citizens with above-average living standards that can afford to make 
additional retirement savings. Thus, analyzing the design of voluntary retirement 
1  Mijatović (2008) advocates the establishment of public pension reserve fund in Serbia, few 
authors including Ilić (2006) have advocated the introduction of mandatory private pension 
funds, while Matković et. al (2009) question the feasibility of mandatory private pension 
funds in Serbia.IS tHErE AN ALtErNAtIVE tO tHE PAYG PENSION SYStEM IN SErBIA?
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saving vehicles and their interaction with the rest of the pension system requires 
exploring additional issues, such as behavioural responses and adverse income 
redistribution concerns (Altiparmakov, 2010).
This paper is organized in the following manner: Section 1 presents the 
theoretical framework for comparing PAYG and (fully-)funded pension systems. 
The following sections present international experiences with the two most 
common approaches to prefunding: establisment of public pension reserve funds 
in developed OECD countries (Section 2) and introduction of mandatory private 
pension funds in emerging European countries (Section 3). relevant lessons for 
Serbia are drawn in Section 4. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
2.   ThEORETICAl fRAmEWORK fOR COmPARInG ThE PERfORmAnCE Of 
PAYG AnD funDED PEnSIOn SYSTEmS
A common belief that is often encountered in the general public is that funded 
pension systems are a-priori superior to PAYG pensions systems, because 
contributions to funded systems are invested for a long period of time, while 
contributions to the PAYG system are immediatelly expensed to pay pensions 
for current pensioners. In fact, both PAYG and funded pension systems have 
investment features: PAYG systems implicitly invest in human capital, while 
funded pension systems explicitly invest in securities and physical capital. Thus, 
when making performance comparisons, one needs to compare the implicit 
PAYG rate of return with the explicit rate of return on capital in the funded 
pension system. The Samuelson-Aaaron Theorem states that the funded pension 
system is more (Pareto) efficient than a PAYG pension system only if it can yield 
a rate of return on capital that is higher than the GDP growth rate (Samuelson, 
1958; Aaron, 1966).2 Otherwise a PAYG pension system should be chosen, as it is 
more efficient and is able to generate higher pension benefits for the same amount 
of pension contributions made.
2  The Samuelson-Aaron Theorem actually refers to the growth rate of covered wages in the 
economy, which can be approximated with the GDP growth rate for all practical purposes. 
Both of these growth rates are driven by productivity growth (per worker) and the growth 
of the working population. As Settergren and Mikula (2005) stress, the Samuelson-Aaron 
theorem holds when the population is at a steady state. Increasing life expectancy, present in 
most countries, actually makes the PAYG Irr slightly larger than the GDP growth, but we 
will (conservatively) ignore this issue in the rest of this paper.92
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When public pension systems were established in the early 20th century, 
choosing PAYG financing was a logical decision due to the high fertility rates in 
most countries, which were believed to be sustainable and would therefore enable 
high implicit PAYG rates of return. However, most of the world has experienced 
significant demographic aging since then: life expectancy has increased 
significantly while fertility rates have declined rapidly to levels which no longer 
enable even simple population reproduction in most European countries. On 
the other hand, returns on capital (equity in particular) experienced extravagant 
growth in the second half of the 20th century – significantly higher than GDP 
growth. Thus, some economists have been advocating moving from PAYG to 
(partially) funded pension systems in order to solve, or at least tame, challenges 
arising from the demographic aging phenomenon.
It should be stressed that the Samuelson-Aaron Theorem provides a criterion 
for choosing a Pareto optimal financing in the case of a country not having any 
pension system in place already. However, when a country is already running 
a mature PAYG pension system, which is the case with basically all European 
countries, then performance comparisons need to take into account the 
significant, multi-decade transition costs that arise from the need to finance two 
pension systems in parallel – provide payments to existing PAYG pensioners and 
prefund resources for the future retirement of existing workers. In this case, it 
is impossible to define a Pareto criterion for whether (partial) pension system 
prefunding is desirable or not, since some population cohorts have to bear the 
transition burden and be worse off in order for other population cohorts to 
potentially benefit from this action (Orszag and Stiglitz, 1999; Diamond, 2002).3 
Boldrin et. al (1999) conclude that ‘’any transition to fuller funding is fundamentally 
an issue of intergenerational redistribution’’. One must thus resort to social norms 
in order to define a suitable criterion for deciding whether or not to undertake 
(partial) prefunding of a mature PAYG pension system. However, it is obvious 
that in this case expected returns on capital need to be significantly higher 
than GDP growth in order to justify bearing the transition costs. For example, 
3  A few authors, including Kotlikoff (1998) and Breyer and Straub (1993), use dynamic 
general equilibrium models to identify circumstances when moving from PAYG to a fully-
funded pension system might be Pareto improving for all generations. However, potential 
Pareto improvements are actually not achieved by the pension reform per se, but by an 
accompanying efficiency-driven tax reform (moving from payroll taxation to consumption 
or lump-sum taxation) that is conducted in order to finance the transition costs. If such 
Pareto improvements were indeed feasible in reality, this tax reform should be undertaken 
irrespective of pension reform efforts.IS tHErE AN ALtErNAtIVE tO tHE PAYG PENSION SYStEM IN SErBIA?
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Altiparmakov (2011) applies some common financial feasibility calculations to 
show that Serbia should dismiss outright the idea of pension system funding via 
the introduction of mandatory private pension funds if those funds cannot be 
expected, with great certainity, to yield net rates of return at least 1.8% above 
GDP growth throughout the entire 21st century.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that funded pension systems are far from being 
immune to the demographic aging phenomenon. Increasing life expectancy 
means that contributors are over time receiving lower pension entitlements for 
the same amount of accumulated pension savings – unless they are postponing 
retirement in line with life expectancy increases. Furthermore, there is abundant 
statistical evidence that demographic trends influence asset returns, so that 
demographic aging could be expected to reduce the high rates of return on capital 
which have been experienced during recent decades (Brooks, 2000; Abel, 2003). 
Of course, capital could be invested abroad in young developing economies, in 
order to diversify returns on pension assets and avoid aging-induced decline in 
the rate of return on capital in the domestic economy. However, identifying young 
developing economies is an increasingly difficult task, as Barr and Diamond 
(2009) show that projected 2050 population pyramids are basically identical 
for the United States, which had a baby-boom, China, which had a one-child 
policy, and India, which had neither. Thus we conclude that demographic aging 
is creating financing challenges for funded pension systems as well, although in 
a less obvious manner than with PAYG systems. This means that the potential 
benefits of partial prefunding and diversification of retirement financing sources 
are limited by the fact that economic and demographic developments affect both 
the returns to labour and the returns to capital.
Many developed and emerging countries have started to partially prefund their 
pension systems during the last couple of decades. However, their prefunding 
approaches have been drastically different. Most developed OECD countries 
opted to maintain their PAYG systems and to strenghten their sustainability by 
establishing or modernizing existing public pension reserve funds. On the other 
hand, most emerging economies in Latin America and Eastern Europe decided 
on a more radical approach: they have partially privatized their existing public 
PAYG systems, replacing them with mandatory private fully-funded pension 
funds. Different prefunding approaches chosen by developed and emerging 
countries can be explained by the differences in their institutional capacities, and 
also by the different ambitions driving the reforms. 94
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3. InTERnATIOnAl ExPERIEnCES WITh PuBlIC PEnSIOn RESERvE funDS
Around the turn of the millenium many developed OECD countries established 
or modernized existing public pension reserve funds (PPrFs) in response to 
clear actuarial warnings that their PAYG systems were not sustainable amid 
demographic aging in the long run.4  5 The main objective of prefunding via 
PPrFs was to implement tax-smoothing over the long-term horizon (basically 
over most of the 21st century) and distribute the aging fiscal burden equitably 
across current and future generations. Most countries have envisaged significant 
prefunding contributions in the period up to 2020 and then gradual withdrawal 
of accumulated funds, since most significant aging-related fiscal pressures are 
projected to occur in the 2020-2050 period when ‘baby-boomers’ in most OECD 
countries will have retired. It is worth exploring some of the most relevant 
prefunding plans implemented by OECD coutries (Yermo, 2008; Vittas et.al. 
2008).
•	 Sweden	modernized	its	PPRF	in	2000,	which	had	been	functioning	since	1960,	
in order to improve performance and limit the influence of social and political 
objectives on investment decisions. Sweden opted for a unique approach 
whereby four seperate PPrFs were established in order to foster competition 
and improve performance. total PPrF assets have reached about 30% of 
GDP, or 3.8 times annual pension payments in 2009 – the year in which the 
PAYG system went into deficit, which is expected to persist for the next forty 
years, during which the Swedish pension system will make withdrawals from 
accumulated PPrF assets.
•	 Canada	also	modernized	PPRF	investment	procedures	in	1997	to	improve	
performance, since surplus funds had been invested solely in goverment 
securities since the establishment of the Canadian PPrF in 1965. Furthermore, 
the decision was made to gradually increase pension contributions from 5.9% 
to 9.9% of gross salaries, in order to accumulate significant PAYG surpluses 
until 2020 and adequately prefund the Canadian pension system. At the end of 
the prefunding period, PPrF assets are forecasted to equal 4.3 times the annual 
pension payment. 
4  Surpluses, and consquently public pension reserves, have existed in many countries in 
the early decades of PAYG systems, before these schemes have matured. However, those 
reserves were modest in size and were not designed to represent an actuarial buffer against 
demographic aging. Furthermore, these initial surplus assets were not managed properly and 
were solely invested in government securities.
5  Besides establishing PPrFs, pension reforms in OECD countries have also included PAYG 
parametric changes (Martin and Whitehouse, 2008).IS tHErE AN ALtErNAtIVE tO tHE PAYG PENSION SYStEM IN SErBIA?
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•	 Norway	created	the	Global Government	Pension	Fund	in	1997.	The	Global	
Fund is financed from petroleum extraction proceeds and is designed to 
alleviate aging pressures on the public pension system in the coming decades. 
Although most countries do not have a rich accumulations of natural resources 
that they can use to prefund pension liabilities, the Norway case study is 
included in this paper because relevant lessons can be drawn from its asset 
management practices.
•	 New	Zealand	established	the	Superannuation reserve Fund in 2001, which 
will	receive	annual	contributions	from	the	governmet	equal	to	about	0.75%	of	
GDP until 2025, while withdrawals from the fund are forbidden before 2020. 
The superannuation fund is expected to accumulate assets higher than 30% of 
GDP by 2025. The goal is to achieve tax-smoothing over the forty-year horizon.
•	 Ireland	established	the	National	Pensions	Reserve	Fund	in	2001,	which	will	
receive annual contributions from the government equal to 1% of GNP until 
2055. Accumulated funds cannot be withdrawn before 2025, when the fund is 
expected to accumulate assets above 40% of GDP.
•	 France	 established	 the	 Pension	 Reserve	 Fund	 in	 1999,	 which	 will	 receive	
funding from various sources (PAYG surpluses, government transfers on an 
ad-hoc basis, specific fees and taxes). Assets will be accumulated until 2020 
and used to finance projected PAYG shortfalls from 2020 to 2040. The design 
of the French PPrF has been repeatedly criticized for being under-funded due 
to annual contribution targets of only 0.2% of GDP, with the target fund value 
in 2020 equaling only 5% of GDP.6
These prefunding plans basically prescribe that current generations are to bear 
a significant portion of the transistion costs associated with the move from 
(predominantly) PAYG to a partially funded PAYG system. In the absence of this 
prefunding, future generations would have to bear the entire aging burden on 
their own, after baby-boomers retire and demographic pressures escalate in the 
2020-2050 period. For example, actuarial projections in Canada showed that in 
the absence of partial prefunding, the pension contributions rate would have to 
increase	from	5.9%	in	1997	to	14.2%	of	gross	wages	in	2030.	Such	a	large	increase	
was deemed socially unacceptable, and after a long public discussion Canadians 
decided to implement partial pension system prefunding in order to achieve an 
equitable distribution of the aging burden across current and future generations. 
Similiar arguments prevailed in the other OECD countries that opted for partial 
6  Some PPrFs have also received one-off privatization proceeds – privatization of state 
telecom in Ireland or sale of licences for third generation cellular phones in France. However, 
these privatization proceeds are marginal in size compared to the total presribed prefunding 
commitments.96
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pension system prefunding. For example, the European Commission (2001) 
similarly projected that the average contribution rate in the EU would have to 
increase	from	16%	in	2000	to	27%	in	2050	in	order	to	honour	pension	liabilities	
in the existing pure PAYG systems. Vibrant economic growth in the nineties 
provided a good living standard, which made it easier for these societies to 
make a sacrifice by allocating a portion of their wealth for the benefit of future 
generations.
3.1. Public Pension Reserve fund Investment Policies
When analyzing the structure of PPrF assets it is important to single out possible 
investment in domestic government bonds. In the context of PPrF, investing 
in domestic goverment bonds does not represent a genuine prefunding and 
accumulation of capital but a disguised PAYG financing, whereby contributors 
are interchanged with taxpayers and implicit pension liabilities are interchanged 
with explicit government debt liabilities. Furthermore, PPrF investment in 
domestic government bonds introduces the possibility of political manipulation 
of investment decisions. For example, the United States have been prefunding 
their pension system since 1983, but all PPrF resources are being invested 
solely in domestic government bonds. Many authors are arguing that this 
arrangement in essence represents a PAYG system hidden behind accounting 
conventions. For this reason we will not explore the United States’ experience 
further in this article, nor the experience of other countries where PPrFs invest 
mostly or exclusively in domestic government bonds, as we do not consider these 
arrangements to represent genuine pension system prefunding. On the other 
hand, the PPrF in Ireland, for example, is explicitly forbidden from investing in 
domestic government securities.
regarding geographic asset allocation, it should be noticed that the PPrF in 
Norway is mandated to exclusively invest in foreign assets. Most PPrF assets 
in	Sweden,	Ireland,	and	New	Zealand	are	also	being	invested	abroad.	However,	
domestic investment in these countries is higher than the share of domestic 
capital markets in the overall world capital market, which implies the presence 
of home bias in investment decisions. Home bias is even more evident in the case 
of France and Canada, where less than half of assets are invested abroad, due 
to political considerations and pressures from labour unions to further improve 
domestic living standards. Since around the turn of the millenium most OECD 
countries enjoyed good living standards with little structural unemployment, 
their macroeconomic conditions were favourable for investing most of the 
PPrF assets abroad. This would arguably represent the best allocation of overall IS tHErE AN ALtErNAtIVE tO tHE PAYG PENSION SYStEM IN SErBIA?
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PAYG-PPrF pension assets, as investing in other economies, especially young 
developing ones, would hedge demographic and economic developments in their 
domestic economies.7 This macroeconomic opportunity has obviously been only 
partially exploited, due to political considerations and home bias in investment 
decisions. This home bias can be expected to result in the suboptimal portfolio 
allocation of pension assets and lower returns to future pension beneficiaries.8
The institutional arrangements and organization of PPrFs is somewhat 
different in the countries under study (Yermo, 2008), but all countries prescribe 
management mandates to achieve optimal investment performance and to ignore 
any non-market considerations such as social or political preferences. Centralized 
administration and management of PPrFs has enabled low operating costs in all 
these countries. The total administrative and investment management costs in 
2008, expressed as a percentage of assets, ranged from about 0.1% in Norway 
and Canada, between 0.1% and 0.15% in Sweden, and about 0.2% in France 
and	Ireland.	New	Zealand’s	relatively	high	operating	costs	of	about	0.6%	are	
somewhat of an outlier, in part due to the significant presence of expensive active 
investment practices.
PPrFs in Canada, Norway, and Sweden are mostly following the growth portfolio 
strategic allocation with 60% of assets held in equities and 40% in bonds. France 
has been following a more conservative 50% equities 50% bonds strategy, while 
Ireland	and	New	Zealand	have	opted	for	more	agressive	investment	strategies,	
with 80% of assets in equities and 20% in bonds. Not all countries have explicit 
long-term performance targets, but those that do target the real rate of return 
of about 4% in the long run. Norway and Canada use the 4% real return target, 
New	Zealand	targets	slightly	above	4%,	while	PPRFs	in	Sweden	have	real	return	
targets of between 4% and 4.5%.9
7  Furthermore, investing exclusively abroad completely eliminates the possibilities for 
politicization of PPrF investment decisions. 
8  In response to these concerns, Canada has constantly increased investment in foreign assets 
since	the	modernization	of	its	PPRF	in	1997.
9	 New	Zealand	is	targeting	2.5%	over	the	risk-free	rate	of	return,	which	translates	into	a	real	
return target of slightly over 4%.98
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Table 1.  Performance of PPrFs in selected OECD countries, in %
Country
Starting 
from
Until	end-2007 Until end-2012
Standard 
deviation
real 
returns
GDP 
growth
Diff
real 
returns
GDP 
growth
Diff
real 
returns
GDP 
growth
Norway Jan	1997 4.3 2.7 1.6 3.3 2.0 1.3 10.6 1.6
Canada Mar 1999 4.9 3.1 1.8 4.0 2.4 1.6 9.4 1.9
Sweden Jan 2001 3.4 3.0 0.3 2.3 2.2 0.1 13.0 2.9
Ireland Apr 2001 2.2 5.1 -2.9 1.2 2.4 -1.2 14.9 3.7
Average   3.7 3.5 0.2 2.7 2.3 0.4 12.0 2.5
Source:  Author’s calculations based on official national PPrF authorities. Data for Sweden reffers 
to AP1 through AP4 national pension funds. 
We highlight the fact that average growth rates in table 1 represent the 
theoretically appropriate geometric averaging. Many authors inappropriately 
rely on the simple arithmetic averaging which overstates actual growth rates. 
The discrepancy between geometric and arithmetic averaging increases with 
the variability of the underlying data. Thus, the effect of overstated growth 
rates is particularly noticeable with pension fund returns, since market returns 
are inherently volatile and more variable than GDP growth. Using arithmetic 
averaging	would	overstate	pension	fund	returns	until	the	end	of	2012	by	0.7	
percentage points, while the overstatement of GDP growth would be only 0.2 
percentage points.10 Thus, in this paper we will be relying exclusively on the 
theoretically appropriate concept of geometric averaging.
Assessing how succesful PPrFs have been in achieving their performance targets 
is challenging, since about one decade of data is a relatively short period of time 
in the context of the long-term pension investment horizon. Furthermore, all 
PPrFs experienced extremely adverse performance in 2008 due to the world 
financial crisis, but rebounded in 2009 and 2010. We can observe from table 1 
that Canada and Norway were successful in achieving the 4% real return target 
before the occurrence of the world financial crisis in 2008. However, thus far 
only the Canadian PPrF has rebounded enough to get back on track with this 
long-run target. Overall we can conclude that international practice indicates a 
4% real rate of return as a reasonable estimate for long-term returns on a well 
diversified portfolio of international pension assets. However, there are significant 
downside risks that this estimate might be overly optimistic, since Canada is 
10  The overstatement effect is particularly strong in Sweden and Ireland, about 1 percentage 
point, due to very volatile pension fund returns in these countries. IS tHErE AN ALtErNAtIVE tO tHE PAYG PENSION SYStEM IN SErBIA?
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the only country that has thus far been able to maintain a performance close 
to the 4% real return benchmark. Furthermore, additional downside risks are 
present due to the potential negative effects that demographic aging could exert 
on capital returns in the coming decades. These concerns have recently lead the 
management of the Canadian PPrF to reduce the real return target from 4.2% 
to 4%. Financial experts in Norway are questioning even the 4% target, arguing 
that the sustainable long-term real rate of return might be closer to the 3% target.
The 4% real rate of return is higher than the projected GDP growth rates of the 
mature OECD economies, which stand in the 2% to 3% range. Thus PPrF returns 
were expected to outperform the existing PAYG pension components. This 
indeed has been the case in Norway, Canada, and Sweden, as we can see in table 
1. However, as mentioned earlier, the driving force behind pension prefunding 
in OECD countries was the desire for tax-smoothing over current and future 
generations and preservation of existing public pension schemes. The expected 
superior performance of PPrF returns over implicit PAYG returns should be 
considered as an additional benefit, but not as the major driving force behind the 
prefunding plans in these countries. 
It should be noticed that the current world economic crisis profoundly negatively 
affected pension prefunding efforts in Ireland and France in 2010. Due to short-
term fiscal and financial pressures the goverments in these two countries decided 
to start withdrawing the accumulated funds and using them for non-pension 
purposes. Ireland used most of its accumulated PPrF assets in 2010 to support its 
failing banking sector, while France plans to use accumulated assets to finance 
welfare	 programs	 from	 2011	 onwards.	 Furthermore,	 New	 Zealand	 stopped	
contributing to its PPrF in 2009 and will resume with annual contributions only 
after the economy recovers and a fiscal surplus re-emerges. These examples go 
to show that, even in developed OECD countries, bearing the transition costs 
and honouring long-term prefunding commitments can be politically and 
socially very challenging, especially during economic downturns and short-term 
financing needs.
4.   InTERnATIOnAl ExPERIEnCES WITh mAnDATORY  
PRIvATE PEnSIOn funDS
Prefunding arrangements in many developing countries in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe have been a constituent part of ambitious pension reform agendas 
that sought to (partially) replace public defined-benefit PAYG pension provision 100
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with private defined-contribution fully funded pension provision. Contrary to 
reform efforts in developed OECD countries which sought to preserve public 
systems, many developing countries opted for a pension system privatization 
approach that would (partially) replace public PAYG systems with mandatory 
private pension funds (MPPFs), due to the general public’s apparent dissatisfaction 
with the performance of public PAYG systems. This reform approach sought not 
only to implement tax smoothing and provide a superior rate of return on pension 
contributions, but also significant side-effect benefits: reducing the number of 
unregistered workers in the shadow economy, increasing national savings, and 
stimulating economic growth by developing efficient capital markets. 
Although the World Bank (1994) had expressed high hopes with respect to 
the beneficial side-effects of pension privatization efforts, many authors have 
raised conceptual concerns with this approach (Beattie and McGillivray, 1995; 
Orszag and Stiglitz, 1999). The extent of the shadow economy and the efficiency 
of domestic capital markets are mostly driven by institutional factors, and 
pension privatization per se can hardly be expected to improve these areas.11 
In particular, Arenas de Mesa and Mesa-Lago (2006) have shown that pension 
coverage has decreased, not increased, in all ten Latin American countries that 
implemented pension privatization in the nineties. Furthermore, the effect of 
pension privatization on overall national saving is ambiguous, as it depends on 
many factors. Although there is a fair bit of empirical evidence that the initial 
introduction of PAYG systems in the early 20th century partially reduced national 
saving (Page, 1998), it should be stressed that shifting from an existing mature 
PAYG scheme to a funded system is a fundamentally different scenario, involving 
different issues. The overall effect on national saving will critically depend on 
the behavioural responses of employees and government and the operational 
details of the pension privatization itself. Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) show that, 
depending on these partial effects, the overall effect on national saving could be 
positive, negative, or neutral. Isolating the pure effect of pension privatization is 
challenging, but empirical evidence from Chile strongly suggests that pension 
privatization did not increase national saving, and might have actually reduced 
it (Arenas de Mesa and Mesa-Lago, 2006). Overall, there has been no empirical 
evidence thus far to suggest that pension privatization had been successful in 
achieving any of the aforementioned side-effect benefits. The independent 
evaluation group of the World Bank (2006) concludes that side-effect benefits 
11  Stiglitz (1989) argues that indirect financing mechanisms through banks and insurance 
companies might be more appropriate for developing countries than direct financing 
mechanisms via capital markets.IS tHErE AN ALtErNAtIVE tO tHE PAYG PENSION SYStEM IN SErBIA?
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“remain largely unrealized”. Therefore in this article we will focus on examining 
the performance of MPPFs in terms of realized rates of return.
Chile was the first country to privatize its pension system in 1981, under the 
Pinochet dictatorship. Inspired by the high real rates of return achieved by 
Chilean MPPFs during the first decade of operation, many countries in Latin 
America implemented similar pension privatization efforts in the nineties. The 
Chilean experience and the World Bank (1994) also influenced many countries 
in emerging Europe to implement similar pension reforms around the turn 
of the millennium. However, many features of the original Chilean approach 
were specific to the prevailing political and economic conditions in Chile in the 
early 1980s. In particular, it is hardly conceivable that an iconoclastic complete 
privatization of a mature public PAYG pension system could be undertaken in 
a democratic setting (Weil, 2008). Thus, most other developing countries opted 
for partial pension privatization in order to constrain the tremendous transition 
costs associated with complete pension system privatization. 
4.1. Pension Privatization in Emerging Europe
Constraining pension privatization transition costs represented a major policy 
consideration in the formerly socialist countries in emerging Europe, since 
universal coverage of existing PAYG systems had implied significant half-a-
century-long transition costs. Thus, emerging European countries opted for 
partial privatization that envisaged one quarter to one third of existing PAYG 
contributions being diverted to newly established fully funded private pension 
funds. MPPFs feature individual retirement accounts whose performance can 
be easily monitored by tracking the value of individual units over time. In this 
manner, we will be measuring gross rates of return net of annual management 
fees, but gross of any entry fees on contributions and any exit fees at retirement.102
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Table 2.  Performance of MPPFs in emerging Europe, in %
Country
Date of 
MPPF 
introduction
Since inception 
until	end-2007
Since inception 
until end-2012
Standard 
deviation
real 
return GDP Diff real 
return GDP Diff returns GDP
Hungary Jan 1998 2.6 3.6 -1.0 1.4 2.4 -0.9 9.3 3.1
Poland Jan 1999 8.2 4.1 4.1 5.4 3.9 1.5 9.2 1.8
Latvia Jul 2001 -2.3 9.5 -11.8 -1.5 4.1 -5.7 8.8 8.2
Bulgaria Apr 2002 4.3 6.3 -2.0 0.3 3.5 -3.3 9.5 3.9
Croatia May 2002 4.5 4.8 -0.4 2.6 1.6 1.0 7.3 4.1
Estonia Jul 2002 3.4 8.1 -4.7 -0.2 3.7 -3.9 11.6 7.2
Lithuania Jun 2004 2.4 8.3 -5.9 -0.1 3.1 -3.1 12.2 7.4
Slovakia Apr 2005 1.1 8.7 -7.6 -1.2 4.3 -5.6 3.8 4.7
Macedonia Feb 2006 2.7 5.6 -2.9 1.8 2.9 -1.1 8.2 2.7
romania May 2008 - - - 5.7 -0.2 5.9 4.5 5.1
Average   3.0 6.6 -3.6 1.4 2.9 -1.5 8.4 4.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on returns data from official national MPPF authorities. 
Inflation (year-end) and GDP data is taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
Data for Hungary refers to the end of 2010 when the MPPF system was nationalized.
As mentioned earlier, the data in table 2 represents geometric averaging. Using 
simple arithmetic averaging would overstate pension fund returns until the end 
of 2012 by 0.4 percentage points, while GDP growth would be overstated by only 
0.1 percentage points.12 Furthermore, we can notice that the standard deviation 
of pension funds’ returns is significantly higher than the standard deviation of 
GDP growth, which confirms the theoretical results that market returns are 
inherently more volatile and more risky than PAYG returns.13
We can notice in table 2 that the initial performance of MPPFs in emerging 
Europe is disappointing. Although they were expected to yield high returns, 
tangibly higher than GDP growth, only MPPFs in Poland, Croatia, and romania 
have been able to beat GDP growth thus far. Furthermore, the data for romania 
12  The overstatement effect in particularly noticeable in countries such as Estonia and Lithuania, 
where	it	is	about	0.7	percentage	points	due	to	very	volatile	pension	fund	returns.
13  Data for Slovakia and romania are exceptions. Due to strict investment regulations in 2008, 
Slovakian pension funds implemented extremely conservative investment policies with very 
low volatility and returns that were correspondingly low, even negative in real terms. MPPFs 
in romania started operating only after the emergence of the global financial crisis and have 
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cannot be considered statistically credible since MPPFs have been introduced only 
recently, after the emergence of the global financial crisis. Also, the performance 
of MPPFs in Croatia is somewhat overstated due to the politically motivated 
artificial inflation of pension fund returns in the inception year (Matković et 
al, 2009). Therefore only in the case of Poland can it be said that pension fund 
returns have definitely been higher than GDP growth. On the other hand, pension 
fund returns in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovakia have posted negative 
real returns, while real returns in Bulgaria were barely above zero. It should 
be stressed that poor MPPF performance cannot be blamed on the 2008 world 
financial crises, as pension funds were unable to outperform GDP growth even 
before this. In order to investigate structural problems with pension privatization 
in emerging Europe we investigate the structure of MPPFs’ portfolio assets.
Table 3.	 MPPF	asset	portfolios,	end-2007	data
Country MPPF assets, 
%GDP
Composition of asset portfolio
Gov’t Bonds Equity Bank Deposits Other
Hungary 7.8 58.5% 32.8% 0.9% 7.9%
Poland 11.9 59.9% 34.9% 2.9% 2.3%
Latvia 1.6 33.4% 24.3% 42.1% 0.2%
Bulgaria 2.1 18.5% 28.3% 16.2% 37.0%
Croatia 6.7 63.6% 26.7% 2.2% 7.4%
Estonia 4.5 31.0% 40.0% 8.0% 21.0%
Lithuania 1.7 29.6% 39.3% 17.5% 13.6%
Slovakia 2.8 49.6% 15.1% 30.5% 4.8%
Macedonia 0.9 59.9% 21.6% 18.5% 0.0%
Source:  Altiparmakov (2011).
Government bonds dominate the portfolios of mandatory private pension funds, 
amounting for more than 50% of total investment assets in Eastern European 
countries and over 30% in Baltic states.14 Government securities have been 
dominating pension funds’ portfolios in Poland since the inception of the MPPF 
system in 1999, with fixed-interest government bonds representing the major asset 
category and accounting for 51% of total pension fund assets. Thus it becomes 
obvious that the observed high returns of private pension funds in Poland are 
due to the very attractive interest rates offered by government securities. We can 
therefore conclude that contributors to Polish private pension funds have little to 
14  In Croatia it is required by law to have at least 50% of assets invested in government-issued 
securities. The same requirement was in force in Bulgaria until mid-2006.104
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be excited about, seeing as higher returns in their individual retirement accounts 
are being financed with their tax money.
In Section 2 we argued that using prefunding resources to invest in domestic 
government bonds essentially represents disguised PAYG financing, whereby 
taxpayers are interchanged with contributors and explicit public debt is 
interchanged with implicit public pension liabilities. The situation is even worse 
in the case of MPPFs investing in domestic government bonds, since net returns 
to contributors will be lower than the implicit PAYG rate of return due to the 
hefty fees charged by pension management companies (see below). Thus, from 
a national point of view, MPPF assets invested in domestic government bonds 
are first-order dominated by the PAYG pension component and should not be 
included in the optimal national pension portfolio. This is most obvious precisely 
in the case of Poland, where the public PAYG pension component is of notional 
defined-contribution (NDC) type. 
One might argue that this is an inherent construction error in the pension 
privatization design in emerging Europe: MPPFs should had been forbidden from 
investing in domestic government bonds, not only to preclude the possibility of 
political manipulation of investment decisions, but also since this arrangement 
is financially inferior to pure PAYG financing. This exact line of reasoning 
lead Poland to significantly redesign its MPPF system in 2011, whereby 90% of 
new contributions flowing to MPPFs are invested in equities, in order to shift 
pension portfolios towards equity assets by 2020 (Bielecki, 2011). Due to limited 
investment possibilities in the domestic capital market, MPPFs’ contribution rate 
has	been	decreased	from	7.3%	to	2.3%	of	gross	wages,	with	the	remaining	5%	
being redirected back to the PAYG pension component.15 Future reform plans 
in Poland include transferring MPPF assets invested in government securities 
back to the state, so that explicit government debt is converted back into implicit 
pension debt and disguised PAYG financing is completely eliminated. 
Despite all formerly socialist countries in emerging Europe having extremely 
undeveloped capital markets, international diversification of MPPF assets is very 
low, due to legal restrictions on investment abroad. For example, at the end of 
2007	investment	abroad	accounted	for	1.3%	of	MPPF	assets	in	Poland,	4.3%	in	
Croatia, 18.5% in Bulgaria, and 40% in Latvia. The reasoning behind the severe 
15  Significant fiscal deficits during the economic recession have also been one of the motives 
for redesigning the Polish pension system and devoting more resources to the public PAYG 
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limits on investment abroad is the desire to use most of MPPFs’ accumulated 
capital to boost domestic economic growth and increase employment, in order 
to catch up with developed economies in Western Europe.16 However, this home 
bias contributed to the disappointing performance of MPPFs that realized returns 
below the implicit PAYG rate of return.
4.2. Private Pension funds’ Operating fees
One more contributing factor to the disappointing performance of pension 
privatizations in emerging Europe are the hefty fees charged by pension 
management companies. In particular, the average (unweighted) contribution 
fee in 2008 amounted to 4.3% of contributions and the average management fee 
amounted to about 1% of assets. Furthermore, based on data from developed 
economies, one can expect the annuity purchase fee to be around 10% of 
accumulated assets at retirement, if or when the withdrawal stage is appropriately 
implemented in emerging Europe.17 
Aggregating all operating fees in one number is somewhat challenging since they 
are charged on a different basis (contributions vs. assets under management) and 
different frequencies. Whitehouse (2001) proposes the use of charge ratio statistics 
that summarize the overall reduction in pension savings for a typical worker 
contributing during a 40-year horizon. Whitehouse shows that the contribution 
fee and annuity-purchase fee translate exactly one-to-one into charge ratio, while 
the management fee of 1% translates to approximately a charge ratio of 20% due 
to the compounding effect. This approximation is very robust with respect to 
plausible economic parameters. Thus, we will use the following approximation in 
the remainder of this section:
charge ratio = contribution fee + annuity purchase fee + 20 × management fee
Calculating the average charge ratio for emerging European countries in 
this manner, we can conclude that management costs eat up about one third 
16  Baltic countries opted for more liberal limitations on investment abroad than Eastern 
European countries, due to concerns over extremely shallow domestic capital markets. 
17  Annuity markets are basically non-existent in emerging Europe at the moment. Since 
efficient private provision of annuities, especially inflation-indexed ones, is an open issue 
even for developed economies, many authors are questioning whether emerging European 
countries are going to be able to properly regulate the withdrawal stage of MPPFs. Without a 
well-functioning annuities market, contributors will not be able to hedge the longevity risk, 
which beats the primary purpose of retirement saving (Diamond and Orszag, 2005). 106
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of retirement assets, with only two thirds of assets going to pensioners. This 
extremely expensive operational structure should be sharply contrasted with 
PAYG operating costs, which are about 1% of retirement assets in all emerging 
European countries.
The problem of the high operating costs associated with MPPFs and individual 
retirement accounts has been extensively documented in the literature, 
including Beattie and McGillivray (1995), Orszag and Stiglitz (1999), and Barr 
(2000). Because of these high costs most developed OECD countries opted for 
prefunding via public pension reserve funds, exploiting economies of scale and 
lack of marketing expenses in order to minimize operating costs.18 Average PPrF 
operating fees in Section 2 equaled 0.2% of assets, implying an overall reduction 
in assets of about 4% during the 40-year retirement saving horizon - which is 
almost ten times less than MPPF operating costs in emerging Europe.
Despite significantly higher operating costs, emerging European countries opted 
for MPPFs instead of PPrFs, due to extensive empirical literature that shows a 
strong correlation between quality of public governance and PPrF performance 
(Iglesias and Palacios, 2000). Due to ongoing transition processes, public 
governance had not been perceived as very credible in most emerging European 
countries, which prompted pension prefunding via MPPFs. It should be noted 
that some countries, including Poland, Croatia, and Slovenia did use a part of 
initial proceeds from the privatization of state-owned companies to establish 
publicly funded pension system buffers. However, these capital accumulations 
were very modest, accounting for only a few percentage points of GDP. These 
one-time actions cannot be considered as serious pension prefunding efforts, nor 
a meaningful demographic buffer.
5. lESSOnS fOR SERBIA
Although one decade of returns data from emerging Europe is not a long period 
in the context of the pension investment horizon, early empirical evidence 
strongly supports the conceptual concerns with the pension privatization 
approach that Beattie and McGillivray (1995) raised. While MPPFs had been 
18  Among OECD countries, Australia opted for the MPPF approach. However, MPPFs in 
Australia were introduced on top of the modest flat-rate public pension system, thus avoiding 
tremendous transition costs. Nonetheless, operating costs of MPPFs in Australia are also high 
and averaged 1.25% of assets under management in 2011 (Australian Prudential regulation 
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expected to yield tangibly higher returns than GDP growth in order to account 
for the transition cost burden, their performance was even lower than implicit 
PAYG rates of return. We have identified two major contributing factors to the 
disappointing performance of MPPFs: high operating costs and undeveloped 
domestic capital markets. Živković (2008) shows that the Serbian capital market 
is extremely shallow and undeveloped, implying that MPPFs in Serbia would face 
a disappointing return performance similar to that in other emerging European 
countries. 
Of course, Serbia could allow MPPFs to invest freely in foreign assets in order to 
overcome the limitations of the domestic capital market. However, it would be ill 
advised to export domestic capital abroad under current Serbian macroeconomic 
conditions – a persistently high unemployment rate of about 20% and a low 
living standard, which stood at only 35% of the EU average in 2011, in GDP 
PPS per capita terms. Bajec et. al (2010) show that Serbia can hardly afford to 
export any domestic savings, since it has to significantly increase the available 
capital for financing domestic investment if it aspires to achieve vibrant growth 
rates (around 5% per year) during the next decade. Lastly, we note that allowing 
MPPFs to invest freely in foreign assets could solve the problem of the extremely 
undeveloped Serbian capital market, but would not help in solving the problem 
of high operating costs, which would eat up one third of retirement saving assets 
under existing MPPF arrangements in emerging Europe.
The only feasible approach to overcoming the significant operating costs 
associated with MPPFs is to opt for pension prefunding through PPrF. However, 
empirical evidence shows a strong correlation between the quality of public 
governance and the performance of PPrFs. Iglesias and Palacios (2000) measure 
the quality of public governance with a combined index comprising (i) efficiency 
of the judiciary system, (ii) the amount of ‘red tape’, and (iii) the corruption 
indicator. In this context it should be noticed that the Serbian judicial system has 
been deemed to be highly inefficient by most international authorities, including 
the European Commission.19 Furthermore, with respect to the amount of ‘red 
tape’, the World Bank Doing Business 2010 report ranks Serbia 88th out of the 
183 economies surveyed, with Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina being the only 
European countries ranking lower than Serbia. The transparency International 
2010	Corruption	Index	ranks	Serbia	78th	among	178	countries	in	the	world,	with	
19  The World Bank Doing Business sub-category on enforcing contracts ranks Serbia 94th out of 
183 countries surveyed in 2010, with Bosnia, Montenegro, and Italy being the only European 
countries with lower rankings.108
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Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina being the only European countries with lower 
ranking than Serbia. Evidently, the quality of public governance in Serbia is low, 
especially by European standards. Thus, if Serbia was to establish a PPrF, one 
could hardly expect that its performance could match the performance of PPrFs 
in developed countries with a high quality of public governance.
Several proposals to establish a public pension reserve fund in Serbia have been 
put forward in the literature, most notably by Mijatović (2008) and Kovačević 
and Bušatlija (2008). Despite disappointing empirical performance from similar 
developing countries with low quality of public governance, these authors 
express optimistic views with respect to the prospects of establishing a PPrF in 
Serbia. However, none of them provide economic analysis to substantiate their 
beliefs. Most importantly, none of them investigate whether pension system 
prefunding via a PPrF would be an economically efficient intergenerational 
transfer of wealth from current to future generations. to investigate this issue 
we take a ‘devil’s advocate’ position and analyze the economic performance of 
a hypothetical scenario, which assumes the ‘best of all worlds’ outcome with 
respect to the possibility of establishing a PPrF in Serbia. 
In particular, we assume that Serbia establishes a PPrF and manages to minimize 
its administrative costs in line with best OECD experiences, despite the low 
quality of public governance in Serbia. Furthermore, we assume that prefunding 
assets are invested solely abroad to overcome the limitations of shallow domestic 
capital markets, despite macroeconomic limitations to exporting domestic 
savings. Finally, we assume that a potential PPrF in Serbia would be able to match 
the investment performance of PPrFs in developed OECD countries, despite the 
aforementioned poor quality of public governance. Even in this highly unrealistic 
scenario, real returns on Serbian prefunding assets would stand at around 4% at 
most, as we elaborated in Section 2. On the other hand, growth projections for 
Serbian GDP also stand in the 4% range in the medium term. Thus, even in this 
hypothetical ‘best of all worlds’ scenario, a potential PPrF in Serbia would not be 
able to beat the expected implicit PAYG rate of return, especially after accounting 
for higher volatility of PPrF returns with respect to PAYG returns.20 But, most 
20  to counter this conclusion, one could of course argue the existence of downside risks with 
respect to achieving the anticipated growth rate in Serbia. However, if Serbia is not able to 
achieve vibrant economic growth in the coming period, in order to close the significant 
development gap with EU standards of living the pension system sustainability issue will be 
completely overshadowed by the sustainability concerns of the overall economic and social 
environment. After all, Barr (2000) highlights economic growth as a key precondition for a 
sustainable pension system, whether public or private, pay-as-you-go or funded.IS tHErE AN ALtErNAtIVE tO tHE PAYG PENSION SYStEM IN SErBIA?
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importantly, PPrF returns would in any case be lower than the cost of Serbian 
public debt, which yields market rates of return of 5% in real terms. Thus, an 
intergenerational transfer in the form of a public pension reserve fund would be 
Pareto inefficient: it is dominated by the possibility of using the available assets to 
repay the outstanding public debt.21 
5.1. Transition Costs
In debating possibilities for prefunding the Serbian pension system, especially 
among the general public, the issue of transition costs is most often neglected 
or understated. In order to build up a capital accumulation significant enough 
to represent a meaningful demographic buffer, current generations need to 
sacrifice a tangible amount of their welfare. In particular, a meaningful PPrF 
cannot be established just by using the proceeds from privatization of state-
owned companies, as some countries in emerging Europe have done, since this 
approach would yield prefunding assets equal to only a few percentage points 
of GDP. From the experience of developed OECD countries, we have seen that 
a meaningful PPrF needs to accumulate assets of at least 30% of GDP, which 
requires a multi-decade prefunding commitment. The appropriate size of a 
potential Serbian PPrF would depend on the accompanying parametric PAYG 
changes. However, due to Serbia’s poor economic and demographic conditions, 
PPrF size relative to GDP can only be expected to be higher in Serbia than in 
developed OECD countries, not lower.
If Serbia were to decide to partially privatize the existing public pension system in 
a similar fashion to aforementioned emerging European countries, the transition 
costs would last about 40 years. If a portion of existing PAYG contributions equal 
to 5% of gross salaries were to be redirected to MPPFs, which can be considered a 
modest pension privatization arrangement in comparison to other countries, the 
average transition cost during the next four decades would equal 0.9% of GDP per 
year. In total, this would amount to about 35% of average GDP realized during 
the next 40 years (Stanic, Altiparmakov and Bajec, 2008). to put these numbers 
into perspective for an average citizen, pension system prefunding that would 
accumulate assets equal to 35% of Serbian GDP, either in the form of PPrFs or 
MPPFs, would produce transition costs of about 20 billion euros in 2013 (net 
present value). This would be sufficient to pay off the entire existing Serbian public 
debt, which currently stands at 19 billion Euros. Thus, if current generations were 
21  Vittas et. al (2008) notice that pension prefunding in developed OECD countries has been 
driven by exactly opposite expectations - investment in global assets was expected to earn a 
higher rate of return than the cost of public debt.110
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in a position to make an economic sacrifice of this extent for the benefit of future 
generations, the most economically efficient and rational manner to make this 
intergenerational transfer would be to repay the outstanding public debt. 
In summary, we can conclude that the effects of potential pension system 
prefunding, either in the form of PPrFs or MPPFs, would be reduced to an 
economically inefficient intergenerational wealth transfer from current to future 
generations.
6. COnCluSIOn
The main conclusion from international experience of pension reform is that 
there is no panacea for the demographic aging phenomenon – each country 
has to identify and implement policies most suited to its own economic and 
social environment. Within the Serbian macroeconomic framework, realized 
returns on a potential funded pension component would likely be inferior to 
the implicit PAYG rates of return, due to undeveloped domestic capital markets, 
high expected growth in domestic productivity, high operating costs of private 
pension management companies, and poor quality of public governance. 
Existing financing problems in the Serbian pension system are not due to PAYG 
financing per se, but to the absence of appropriate parametric PAYG adjustments 
to demographic and economic changes throughout recent decades.
Enthusiasm for pension privatization and high expectations from mandatory 
private pension funds turned out to be mostly unfounded in emerging Europe. 
Due to the poor performance of MPPFs, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia 
have significantly scaled down their mandatory private fully-funded pension 
components, while Hungary has completely nationalized MPPFs and switched 
back to the pure PAYG system. Similiarly, we have shown that the enthusiasm 
some authors have expressed for establishing a public pension reserve fund in 
Serbia is also unfounded. Potential PPrF would likely realize returns below the 
implicit PAYG rate of return, and it would most certainly realize returns below 
the market interest rate on outstanding public debt. Establishing a PPrF seems 
to be a feasible investment in some developed countries with high credit rating 
and high quality of public governance, but the situation is quite the opposite with 
developing countries such as Serbia, characterized with low credit ratings and 
low quality of public governance. Thus, we can conclude that pension system 
prefunding, either via mandatory private pension funds or a public pension 
reserve fund, would represent an economically inefficient intergenerational IS tHErE AN ALtErNAtIVE tO tHE PAYG PENSION SYStEM IN SErBIA?
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transfer. If a wealth transfer from current to future generations were desirable 
from a macroeconomic or social perspective, a more efficient mechanism would 
be the repayment of public debt.
Economic analysis in this paper has shown that moving from the pure PAYG 
system to a partially funded pension system cannot yield superior economic 
performance, especially after taking into account multi-decade transition costs. 
Therefore we conclude that future efforts should be directed towards identifying 
parametric adjustments that would make the existing PAYG pension system 
socially acceptable and fiscally sustainable in the long run. Furthermore, 
voluntary retirement savings vehicles should be adequately integrated into 
mandatory aspects of the pension system and overall fiscal system.
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